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ABSTRACT
This paper explores the contrast of China’s spectacular economic development
and the low scores of trust for the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) legitimacy among
the Chinese people. The sharp contrast may reflect flaws in the shaping of de facto
authority of the Chinese government. The de facto authority is examined in connection
to the notion of the Mandate of Heaven from the Confucian tradition. The severe
imbalance of economic growth and lack of political reform is discussed against the
backgrounds of the domestic and international political circumstances. This paper argues
that, in spite of the phenomenal economic development of the past three decades, the
Chinese people’s mixed feelings about the legitimacy of the Chinese authorities may be
rooted in the combination of the rescued Mandate of Heaven through economic growth
and the CCP’s flawed legitimacy based on de facto authority.
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Introduction
Since the economic reform of the late 1970s, China has been one of the fastestgrowing economies in the world. From 1979 to 2013, China’s real gross domestic
product (GDP) increased at an average rate of about 10%. Compared with the growth rate
of 4.4% from 1953 to 1978, the highest growth rate of 14.2% seems staggering. The
global economic crisis that hit in 2008 dealt a blow to the rapid growth trajectory. GDP
grew 7.7% in 2012 and 2013 and it was expected to grow 7.4% in 2014 (Morrison, 2014).
After three decades of rapid growth, the Chinese economy is now getting into a period of
what is called a “New Normal” of lowered economic growth (Xi, 2015). China’s
economic surge in the last few decades has brought prosperity, but its modernization is
imbalanced. This paper explores China’s recent experiences of modernization, and how
China’s unique modernization experiences affects the legitimacy of the Chinese
government among its people and on an international stage.
China’s Early Modernization Efforts in a Nutshell
Efforts toward modernization in China started in the nineteenth century. Early
attempts by activists toward the end of Qing Dynasty involved adopting the functions of
Western modernity while preserving the essence of Chinese tradition (Rosker, 2014). The
efforts to modernize within the framework of royal power failed because of a lack of
coherence, a lack of continuity, and because of a disconnect between sources of
knowledge in the West and in China (Bergere1994; Rosker 2014).1 Sun Yat-sen used the
Nationalist rhetoric and led a series of painstaking endeavors in the Nationalist movement

1

The modernization efforts since the late nineteenth century are beyond the concerns of this paper. They
provide a background for the more recent modernization efforts.
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that overthrew the Qing Dynasty, which was perceived “foreign” because it was
originally a non-Han nomad nation to the northeast of China that had destroyed the HanChinese Ming Dynasty. Sun Yat-sen became the founding interim president of the
Nationalist republic government but soon had to give up that position.
Nevertheless, Sun Yat-sen developed the “Three Principles of the People” as a
form of political guidelines for nation-building and “The International Development of
China” as his envisioned economic modernization blueprints (Bergere, 1994). The
Nationalist government headed by Jiang Kai-shek, which bore the frontal resistance to
Japanese invasion during the Second World War, was substantially weakened at the end
of the War. During the brief period between the end of Second World War and the Civil
War, the Communists applied various rhetorical strategies in the struggles with the
Nationalists for political power. They accused the Nationalist government of suppressing
democracy and exercising military autocracy. Mao Zedong claimed that the Communists
were fighting for a democratic society, a feat commensurate to what Washington and
Lincoln did in the United States. The Communists were able to gain cooperation and
support from other small political parties in China. The Nationalists, who appeared to be
(temporarily) totalitarian, were deeply frustrated by the suspicion from Western countries
(Deng 2014). Substantially weakened during the Second World War, the Nationalists
were losing the Chinese Civil War that broke out after the Second World War to the
Communists even with the various sources of aid from the United States.
After the Communists defeated the Nationalists, they did not establish a
democracy. In the eyes of Western scholars, “China did not pursue the ideal of ‘progress’
in the Western sense” and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was perceived as a new
5

dynasty under the control of the CCP that failed to establish a modern Western-style
democracy (Kissinger, 2012, p.96). The first three decades of the PRC was punctuated
with political movements. Mao started them in rapid succession to consolidate the power
of the CCP in China. Meanwhile, Mao obtained absolute control by building up his own
charisma in the nation and in the Party. Economic development was brought to the top
priority occasionally during the Great Leap Forward (1958-1961), which was supposedly
an initiative directed towards an economic feat; the movement, however, had a strong
color of a political campaign. It was based more on ideological fervor about the
superiority of socialism over capitalism than on sound economic policy. In 1966, a few
years after the failure of the Great Leap Forward, Mao launched the Cultural Revolution
in order to purge those who advocated economic growth over class struggles. The
movement brought the Chinese economy to the brink of collapse (Kissinger, 2012). The
shift from the revolutionary rhetoric to economic reform did not occur until the late 1970s.
The first Chinese leader in the post-Mao era began to implement Sun Yat-sen’s
modernization plans (Bergere, 1994)
Domestic and International Politico-Economic Structure
China’s experiences of modernization in recent decades occurred when domestic,
economic and political situations demanded a change of policy directions. This period
was also characterized by a major shift in the international geopolitical dynamic. The
Cold War had lasted four decades after the Second World War. Within the Communist
camp, China was faced with increasing pressure and threat from the Soviet Union.
Overall, China was in need of a way out of the conundrum of having two stronger
adversaries who were adversaries to each other. US National Security Advisor Henry
6

Kissinger’s secret visit to China in 1971 paved the way for U.S. President Richard
Nixon’s visit to China in 1972. Kissinger (2012) addressed the importance of necessary
conditions for historical events to occur and discussed the significance of craft and
agency of statesmanship and the critical timeliness of decision making and policy
implementation:
“Leaders cannot create the context in which they operate. Their distinctive
contribution consists in operating at the limit of what the given situation permits.
If they exceed these limits, they crash; if they fall short of what is necessary, their
policies stagnate. If they build soundly, they may create a new set of relationships
that sustains itself over a historical period because all parties consider it in their
own interest. (p. 215)”

Kissinger’s remarks are not restricted to extolling the historically significant feats
wrought by American and Chinese leaders of the day. They can be used to make sense of
failures of early efforts toward modernization in China. For example, Sun Yat-sen was
not able to create the context in which he operated. In hindsight, his “Three Principles of
the People” and “The International Development of China” displayed profound foresight,
but these desires unfortunately exceeded the limits of his era and his efforts crashed
(Bergere, 1994). Nonetheless, his visions were to be put to practice when the domestic
and international circumstances became ripe toward the end of the 1970s.
The rapid rapprochement after over twenty years of hostility between the United
States and China benefited both countries, as it significantly alleviated the pressure of
both countries from the difficulties in their respective relationships with the Soviet Union.
The Shanghai Communiqué forged an alliance in which each side committed itself to
avoiding hegemonic intentions in the Asia-Pacific region while voicing their opposition
against further Soviet expansion (Kissinger, 2012). As further evolvements demonstrated,
7

the rapprochement not only improved the geopolitical situations for both countries, it
served as the initial political preparations for the economic benefit both countries were to
receive in the decades that followed.
The rapprochement opened opportunities for US capital to tap low-cost resources
in China. In the mid-1970s the economies of war-torn European and Asian countries
resumed production of goods for export and became competitors with the United States.
American corporations were faced with declining profit rates. The US business sector
supported policies that would reduce the power of organized labor, reduce government
regulations on U.S. businesses, and reverse a declining work ethic among American
workers. One important response of the corporate leaders was to embark on a forty-year
program of increased foreign investment, mergers and joint ventures with foreign
corporations while outsourcing and offshoring domestic production. (Wysong, Perrucci
& Wright, 2014). The increasing imperative for American and other Western sources of
capital to look overseas, particularly in less-tapped countries, for cheap labor and other
resources coincided with the emerging needs for direct foreign investment in China. This
international structure facilitated the creation of an economic partnership that
complimented the political partnership that was established at the end of the Cold War.
The rapprochement also brought unprecedented economic opportunities for China.
After Mao’s death in 1976, China broke away from the Maoist variant of the classical
Stalinist model. Economic development then became a national priority. The switch
became practical when the relation with the United States was beginning to normalize. A
favorable international environment made it possible to consider implementing policies
similar to “The International Development of China” proposed by Sun Yat-sen in 1912
8

(Bergere, 1994). One essential factor made the changes not only possible, but also
effective. The timing of the making and implementation of government policies at the
moment the external conditions were ripe and most favorable was essential to China’s
economic development (Kissinger, 2012). The Chinese government seized the
opportunity to implement a series of new economic policies with a clear orientation
toward a market economy. Although the needs for rapprochement by both the United
States and China were initially motivated by geopolitical considerations, the
normalization of relations paved the way to economic cooperation that was to follow
almost immediately. Early economic policy changes occurred in the fields of agriculture
and external economic relations (Ellman, 1986). China’s economic modernization was
beginning to set into a rapid track in late 1970s.
China’s Imbalanced Modernization and Unconvinced Legitimacy
Modernization theory has numerous sources. It addresses not only tradition versus
modernity in terms of conceptual schemes such as the rationality, individualism, activism,
and bureaucratization, but it also deals with empirically testable propositions about GDP
per capita or life expectancy and the related economic, social, political and personality
structures of a society. Since industrialization was seen as the driving force of
modernization, GDP per capita has been commonly used as a measure (Marsh, 2014).
Early modernization theory has been criticized for taking modernization as
Westernization. The Western conception of democracy became a dominant global
ideology (Torfason and Ingram, 2010). It has been widely recognized later that the core
processes of modernization – industrialization, urbanization, technology, structural
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differentiation, bureaucratic rationality – are not inherently Western as demonstrated by
the experiences of Japan and other Asian societies (Marsh, 2014).
In 1978, Deng Xiaoping raised the idea of Four Modernizations for China, namely
the modernization of agriculture, industry, science and technology, and national defense
(Marsh, 2014). In a tone similar to the modernization efforts in the nineteenth century,
under Deng Xiaoping’s policies, China “adopted what is useful in Western modernization
theory and discarded its unfit components,” and formed “a modernization outlook with
Chinese characteristics” (Cao, 2009, p. 10-11). It should be noted that the livelihood of
the people was the most important of Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles of the People
(nationalism, democracy and the livelihood of the people) (Bergere, 1994). It is not
surprising that the Four Modernizations have a clear focus on industrialization and the
economy. However, it may appear unacceptable that political modernization or the
globally accepted ideology of democracy is not even mentioned in the Four
Modernizations. Critics pointed out that a fifth modernization – democracy is needed in
order for China’s modernization project to be complete.
The primordial importance of the livelihood of the people may be found
throughout Chinese history. Wasserstrom (2010) discusses the repeated Chinese dynastic
cycles that transfer the Mandate of Heaven from a regime less mindful of the people’s
need to a more virtuous and deserving one. He suggests that, like previous dynasties, the
Nationalists lost the Mandate of Heaven as the last power turnover in Chinese history.
Nuyen (2013) explores the concept in the contextual era of 2,000 years ago without
imposing anything additional on what the concept originally meant. Mencius, the most
important Confucian beside Confucius himself, would allow for a popular revolt against a
10

despotic ruler although he would consider it inappropriate to claim that ordinary people
know Heaven’s will. If a corrupt regime is replaced by a new one, the latter presumably
assumes a certain level of political legitimacy. Even if Heaven does not speak, later on
“political legitimacy (illegitimacy) is confirmed as the consequence of seeing that the
people are prospering (suffering)” (Nuyen, 2013, p. 122). According to Confucius, or
Mencius more specifically, the ideal society is one in which the Emperor rules with the
Mandate and provides the order under which the people are able to make a prosperous
living. In this sense, the Nationalists were unfortunate to preside over a distressed wartorn and semi-colonized society. Probably not entirely by their own fault, they lost the
Mandate of the Heaven which was passed to the Communists, who, similar to leaders of
many rebellions in Chinese history, seized power and assumed de facto authority as a
result of military victories. The Mandate of Heaven may be tacitly passed from the
Nationalists to the Communists as a de facto transfer of political control and authority. To
prove the regime established by the Communists has been granted the Mandate of the
Heaven, they must enable the Chinese people to live a prosperous life.
The Communists did not prove their worthiness of the Mandate of Heaven after
they seized power as they spent the first few decades on stabilizing control of the society.
Mao “sought radical and instant transformation and a total break with the past”
(Kissinger, 2012, p.94). This strategy, however, ironically solidified his position on top
of the traditional Confucian-style institutions through the rhetoric of continuous
revolution (Kissinger, 2012). Mao’s excessive reliance on political movements failed to
provide an order to allow the people a prosperous life. The legitimacy that came as a de
facto authority when the Communists took control of the country from the Nationalists
11

was being squandered. However, the successful execution of the Four Modernizations
since the late 1970s has improved the standard of living, created a growing middle class,
and drastically reduced poverty in China. This paper argues that the economic
achievement during the past three decades came to the rescue of the Communist
government from completely losing the Mandate of the Heaven. The rapid increase of the
gap between the rich and poor may be a threat to the government’s legitimacy. In
addition, although the modernization project without a political component has brought
the Chinese people with prosperity, it keeps pestering the Communist Party of China with
its unconvinced legitimacy. Such a dubious legitimacy should manifest itself in the level
of people’s support to the Party. Meanwhile it should serve as a pushing force toward
political reform in China2.
Methods
China’s recent modernization efforts started in the late 1970s. World Bank has
published relatively more complete data about China’s economic performance since 1980.
Aggregate data about China between 1980 and 2013 published by World Bank are used
to illustrate the economic modernization of the country in the past three decades. The
measures include gross domestic product (GDP), GDP growth rate, GDP per capita,
foreign direct investment (FDI), agricultural and nonagricultural employment as a
percentage of total employment, rural population and urban population as a percentage of
total population. Data from World Bank also provide measures of the quality of life of
Chinese people such as the percentage of poverty at $1.25 a day based on purchase power
2

Through the course of this study, it has come to light that the CCP is implementing what it calls the Fifth
Modernization (modernization of the national governance system and governing ability) which is beginning
to emphasize the rule of law but avoids mentioning democracy in the Western sense.
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parity (PPP), total health expenditure as a percentage of GDP, and income shared by the
five population quintiles as a percentage of GDP.
Legitimacy is measured by four proxy variables obtained from a public survey
conducted in China by the online People’s Tribune, a subsidiary of the official People’s
Daily in China. The survey asked the following questions: 1. “Do you agree that CCP has
sufficient courage and wisdom to speed up reform?” 2. “Do you agree with the statement
that ‘sticking to the development of socialism with Chinese characteristics is beneficial to
the fundamental interests of the broadest masses of people’?” 3. “Do you agree with the
statement that ‘it is only the CCP that is able to lead the people well down the route of
socialism with Chinese characteristics’?” and 4. “How do you take on the system of
‘ruled by one party (CCP) and participated by many’ practiced in China?” The survey
result was published synchronically online as participants submitted their answers.
Findings
Economic Growth
Figures 1 and 2 report China’s GDP and Foreign Direct Investment between 1980
and 2013. China’s GDP in 1980 was $189.4 billon. In 2013 it was $9.24 trillion, an
increase of 48.8 times. In 1980 Deng Xiaoping expected that Chinese economy would
“double two times” from 1981 by the end of the twentieth century, which would require
an average annual growth of 7.2%. Many took that as a bold unrealistic prospect because
that level of growth would only be sustained during a period restoring from a war or
natural disaster. Using Chinese data Lin found that China’s annual economic growth was
9.7% between 1978 and 2007 (Lin, 2014). Data from World Bank (Table 1) shows that
the annual GDP growth rate reached two digits at 10.9% in 1983. During the thirty-four
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years from 1980 and 2013 there were fifteen years in which annual growth reached or
exceeded 10%, with an average of 9.86%. As the base sizes of earlier years’ GDPs were
small, the net increases were also small. For instance, the growth rate of 10.9% converted
to a per capita GDP increase from $201.4 of 1982 to $223.3 of 1983, a net increase of
only $20.90. As the GDP base sizes kept increasing, the net increases became much
larger as shown in Figure 1.
Growth slowed between 1989 and 1991 after the Beijing Massacre of June 1989.
Those were the few years the new leader, Jiang Zemin as established by Deng Xiaoping,
displayed uncertainty about further economic reform. Deng Xiaoping's speeches during
his Southern Tour in 1992 reiterated the necessity for continued economic reform. The
same year, GDP growth rate surged a 14.2% and remained at two digits for five years. In
the period between 1997 and 2002, GDP grew at rates between 7.6% and 9.3%. From
2003 the growth rate reached two digits again and plateaued for a few years until it
peaked again at 14.2% in 2007. Growth rate dropped dramatically to 9.6% in 2008, the
year the world-wide recession broke out, which no doubt stunted the dramatic growth that
China experienced from 1999 to 2007. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that GDP growth
rates persisted at the above 9.2% level for the next few years, until they dropped to 7.7%
since 2012.
Table 1 also shows foreign direct investment. World Bank data indicate that the
FDI in China in 1982 was only $430 million. FDI increased slowly but steadily until
1991. It should be noted that the Tiananmen Square massacre did not seem to affect FDI.
Similar to the performance of GDP growth, after Deng Xiaoping’s reassurance of
continued economic reform in early 1992, FDI experienced a sharp hike that year to
14

$11.16 billion. Then, there was another steady increase of FDI until 2004, which was
followed by a second hike in 2005 to $111.21 billion. Since then FDI has been in a third
period of steady increase. The high correlation between FDI and GDP does not warrant
speculation of causal relations but it is strong indication that increasing FDI contributed
to the growth of GDP.

Figure 1. China's GDP 1980 to 2013 (current US$)
Source: World Bank
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Figure 2. FDI (foreign direct investment) to China
from 1980 to 2013
Source:World Bank
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Table 1. GDP, GDP Per Capita, GDP Growth Rate and FDI from 1980 to 2013

Year
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013

GDP (current US$)
189,400,991,348.90
194,109,567,421.60
203,181,343,416.90
228,454,092,247.40
257,430,422,884.00
306,667,904,949.80
297,831,277,506.80
270,372,534,122.40
309,523,098,698.40
343,974,067,007.60
356,937,329,023.30
379,468,645,984.90
422,660,548,425.40
440,501,207,081.70
559,224,201,926.10
728,007,549,739.40
856,084,628,929.80
952,653,115,236.50
1,019,461,964,545.90
1,083,278,591,739.60
1,198,474,937,919.30
1,324,806,909,018.30
1,453,827,558,024.40
1,640,958,734,587.30
1,931,644,329,934.30
2,256,902,590,825.30
2,712,950,885,444.10
3,494,055,942,162.30
4,521,827,271,025.60
4,990,233,518,751.70
5,930,502,270,313.00
7,321,891,954,608.10
8,229,490,030,100.00
9,240,270,452,047.00

GDP Per Capita
(current US$)
193.0
195.3
201.4
223.3
248.3
291.8
279.2
249.4
281.0
307.5
314.4
329.7
362.8
373.8
469.2
604.2
703.1
774.5
820.9
864.7
949.2
1041.6
1135.4
1273.6
1490.4
1731.1
2069.3
2651.3
3413.6
3748.5
4433.3
5447.3
6092.8
6807.4

GDP Growth
(Annual %)
7.8
5.2
9.1
10.9
15.2
13.5
8.8
11.6
11.3
4.1
3.8
9.2
14.2
14.0
13.1
10.9
10.0
9.3
7.8
7.6
8.4
8.3
9.1
10.0
10.1
11.3
12.7
14.2
9.6
9.2
10.4
9.3
7.7
7.7

FDI (foreign direct
investment, current
US$)

430,000,000
636,000,000
1,258,000,000
1,659,000,000
1,875,000,000
2,314,000,000
3,194,000,000
3,393,000,000
3,487,000,000
4,366,000,000
11,156,000,000
27,515,000,000
33,787,000,000
35,849,200,000
40,180,000,000
44,237,000,000
43,751,000,000
38,753,000,000
38,399,300,000
44,241,000,000
49,307,976,629
49,456,847,102
62,108,043,001
111,210,225,749
133,272,548,472
169,389,842,758
186,797,550,544
167,070,808,699
272,986,562,273
331,591,710,742
295,625,587,109
347,848,740,397

Source: World Bank http://data.worldbank.org/indicator
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Urbanization and Employment
Figure 3 provides information about China’s rural and urban populations and
employment rates. In 1980, only 19% Chinese lived in urban areas and the remaining 81%
lived in rural areas. In 2013 after 33 years, the urban population increased to 53% and the
remaining 47% still live in rural areas. Agricultural employment decreased
correspondingly from 69% in 1980 to 35% in 2011. The unemployment rates essentially
remained around 4.4% from 1991 when data became available to 2013.

Figure 3. Agriculture Employment, Rural Population, Urban
Population, and Unemployment (% of total population)
Source: World Bank
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Life Expectancy, Prenatal Care and Infant Mortality
Table 2 provides information on life expectancy, prenatal care, and infant mortality. Life
expectancy for females increased from 69 in 1980 to 77 in 2012, an increase of 11.6% in
32 years. Life expectancy for males increased from 66 in 1980 to 74 in 2012, an increase
of 12.1%. Seventy percent of pregnant women received prenatal care in 1992. The
percentage increased to 95 in 2012. Infant mortality rate was 48 per 1,000 live births in
1980. The rate steadily decreased to 11 per 1,000 in 2013.
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Table 2. Life Expectancy, Prenatal Care and Infant Mortality

year
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013

Life Expectancy
at birth, female
(years)
69
69
69
69
70
70
70
70
71
71
71
71
71
72
72
72
72
73
73
73
74
74
74
75
75
75
76
76
76
76
76
76
77

Life Expectancy at
birth, male (years)
66
66
66
66
67
67
67
67
68
68
68
68
68
68
69
69
69
69
70
70
71
71
72
72
73
73
73
73
73
73
74
74
74

Pregnant
women
receiving
prenatal care
(%)

70
73
76
79
84
86
87
89
89
90
90
89
90
90
90
91
91
92
94
94
95

Infant mortality
rate (per 1,000
live births)
48
46
45
43
43
42
42
42
42
42
42
42
41
40
39
38
36
35
34
32
30
28
26
24
22
20
19
17
16
15
14
13
12
11

Source: World Bank http://data.worldbank.org/indicator
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Poverty Rates and Distribution of Income
The poverty rate was calculated with the threshold of $1.25 a day. In 1981, 84.3% lived
below $1.25. The rate declined to 54% in 1987. However it climbed up to 60.7% in 1990,
and then steadily dropped to 6.3% in 2011. The decrease of poverty population was
drastic in the 30 years (Table 3). However, the distribution of income to the lowest
quintile declined from 8.7% of the total income in 1981 to 4.7% of the total income, a
sharp decline in share. The second lowest quintile received 13.5% of the national income
in 1981 but the share decreased to 9.6% in 2008. The third quintile retained essentially
the same share of slightly above 15%. The fourth quintile managed to retain over 22% of
the total share of income until 2008. From 2010 the income shared by the fourth quintile
declined to below 19%. The group that reaped the most income increase was the highest
quintile. Their share of total income increased from 37.9% in 1981 to a high of 48.6% in
2002 and declined very slightly in 2010. As GDP increased nearly 49 times from 1980 to
2013, the highest quintile’s steadily increasing share of total income in such a rapidly
growing economy indicates a rapid growth of gap between the rich and poor. Poverty
rates, however, have drastically declined during the same period of time, which may
indicate a significant improvement in the quality of life in general. This general
improvement in the quality of life may improve the legitimacy of the government, but
this improvement is potentially undermined by the rapidly enlarging gap between the rich
and the poor. This gap may offset the improvement of the legitimacy based on pure GDP
growth.
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Table 3. Poverty Rates and Distribution of Income among Five Quintiles

Year
1981
1984
1987
1990
1993
1996
1999
2002
2005
2008
2010
2011
2012

Poverty at $1.25
a day (PPP) (%
of population)
84.3
69.4
54
60.7
54.9
37.4
36
28.1
15.8
12.3
9.2
6.3

Lowest
20%
income
shared
8.7
8.9
8
8
7.4
7.2
6.4
5.5
5
4.8
4.7

Second
lowest
20%
13.1
13.5
13.1
12.2
11.3
11.3
10.3
9.4
9.9
9.6
9.7

Third
20%
14.7
17.8
17.6
16.5
15.8
15.8
15
14.3
15
15
15.3

Fourth
20%
22.9
23.2
23.4
22.6
22.3
22.3
22.2
22.2
22.2
22.7
18.7
19.2
19.7

Highest
20%
37.9
36.6
37.9
40.7
43.2
43.3
46.1
48.6
47.9
47.9
47.1

Source: World Bank http://data.worldbank.org/indicator
Domestic Perceptions of the CCP and Its Political Legitimacy
China is realizing its modernization dreams in terms of economic development.
The rapid GDP growth, urbanization, increasing health care expenditure, decline of
poverty, increasing life expectancy, prenatal care, and decreasing infant mortality rate
should point to improvement of Chinese government’s legitimacy. However, the rapidly
growing gap between the rich and the poor may make people question the very nature of
the Communist Party. Does the Communist Party fight for the working people as it
traditionally claims? What does the enlarging gap between the rich and poor tell about the
Party? Questions such as these may cast doubts over the slogans generated by the system.
Table 4 presents the online survey conducted by People’s Tribune, an online
version of the magazine affiliated to the most important official newspaper in China, The
20

People’s Daily. The information was copied from the ongoing survey which was being
updated with incoming responses daily in April, 2013. In other words, the information in
Table 4 does not represent the final result of the survey. It was captured while the survey
was still going on. The uncompleted survey is used, because the author of this paper did
not have access to the final result, which may have been published online but soon
removed.
To the question “Do you agree that the CCP has sufficient courage and wisdom to
speed up reform?” only 7.41% respondents selected “Strongly agree.” Another 5.88%
agreed. That makes a mere 13.29% of the respondents that made a positive answer. With
the 13.25% who chose “Don’t know,” there was a high of 73.45% of the respondents that
selected “Disagree.” Responses to the next three questions display the same tendency
with an overwhelming proportion of respondents who selected “Disagree.”
To the question “Do you agree with the statement that "sticking to the
development of socialism with Chinese characteristics is beneficial to the fundamental
interests of the broadest masses of people?” only 5.25% answered “Strongly Agree.”
Another 4.51% selected “Agree.” That makes a combined less than 10% of the sample
who believed that the development of socialism with Chinese characteristics is beneficial
to the fundamental interests of the broadest masses of people. The overwhelming 81.26%
of those surveyed disagreed with the statement.
Furthermore, slightly fewer than 9% of those surveyed agreed or strongly agreed
that “it is only the CCP that is able to lead the people well down the route of socialism
with Chinese characteristics”. This data is complicated by the inability to discern if the
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people disagreed with the CCP’s competence, the CCP’s rhetoric, or both. Regardless,
this question suggests that the CCP’s competence and the CCP’s rhetoric may be at odds
with what the Chinese people see as beneficial.
Finally, 12.34% of those surveyed agreed or strongly agreed with the system of
“ruled by one party (the CCP) and participated by many practiced in China. This data
suggests that further political reform is in order that would better solidify the legitimacy
of the CCP. Overwhelmingly, the data suggests discontentment with the political system
and the CCP’s official rhetoric. In effect, this discontentment demonstrates the insecurity
of de facto authority.
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Table 4. People’s Tribune Survey of Confidence, Conviction and Faith, 2013
Question

Response

Do you agree that the CCP has sufficient Strongly
courage and wisdom to speed up reform? Agree

7.41

Agree

135

5.88

Don’t Know

304

13.25

Disagree

1685

73.45

2,294

100.00

Strongly
Agree

120

5.25

Agree

103

4.51

Don’t Know

207

9.06

Disagree

1856

81.26

2,286

100.00

Strongly
Agree

130

4.80

Agree

96

4.18

Don’t Know

194

8.46

Disagree

1094

82.56

2,294

100.00

Strongly
Agree

159

6.93

Agree

124

5.41

Don’t Know

177

7.72

Disagree

1833

79.94

2,293

100.00

Total
Do you agree with the statement that "it
is only the CCP that is able to lead the
people well down the route of socialism
with Chinese characteristics"?

Total
How do you take on the system of "ruled
by one party (CCP) and participated by
many" practiced in China?

Percentage

170

Total
Do you agree with the statement that
"sticking to the development of
socialism with Chinese characteristics is
beneficial to the fundamental interests of
the broadest masses of people"?

Frequency

Total
Source: The People’s Tribune. http://www.rmlt.com.cn/
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Discussion
China’s economic achievement in the last three decades has been breathtaking. As
data from the World Bank indicate, GDP grew nearly 50 times in the last three decades or
so. The statistics display remarkable improvement in the areas of poverty, health care,
prenatal care, infant mortality and life expectancy. Based on the traditional understanding
of the Mandate of Heaven, the Chinese government should enjoy wide support from the
people. Nonetheless, the Chinese official online People’s Tribune survey showed the
contrary. An overwhelming majority did not believe that the official rhetoric of “sticking
to the development of socialism with Chinese characteristics was beneficial to the
fundamental interest of the broadest masses of the people.” This attitude may be related
to the distribution of the results of the economic growth.
Although the standard of living substantially improved for all groups, including
the poor, the top quintile received the largest share of total income. On the other hand, the
income share of the lowest quintile has continually declined. A large part of the
population may have escaped or are escaping absolute poverty, but they may be headed
into the great pressure that comes with looming relative poverty. It would be difficult for
these people to be fully convinced of the benefit the overall socio-economic changes of
the society have brought to them. This perception of relative poverty is further
exacerbated by the CCP’s tendency to favor ‘quasi-monopolies,’ which were created and
protected by the state; they have contributed remarkably to China’s on-going economic
development (Wallerstein, 2000). The re-investment of wealth into the quasi-monopolies
explains, in part, the significant growth in the wealthiest quintile’s share of the country’s
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economic rewards. The quasi-monopolies also explain discontentment with the
distribution of wealth as a form of relative poverty rather than absolute poverty.
The overwhelming majority of those surveyed did not believe that “it is only the
CCP that is able to lead the people well down the route of socialism with Chinese
characteristics.” If the people are not convinced of the benefit the economic development
has brought to them, it is difficult for them to support the system wholeheartedly. Besides,
the Chinese characteristics remain poorly defined. If respondents were suspicious of the
rhetoric of socialism with Chinese characteristics, they might have given the CCP low
scores because they rejected the concept itself rather than whether they thought it was
CCP or any other political party that would be able to lead the country properly.
The lack of belief in the official rhetoric of socialism with Chinese characteristics
is also reflected in, if not explained by, the response to the question “How do you take on
the system of ‘ruled by one party (CCP) and participated by many’ practiced in China?”
There seems to be a deep suspicion among Chinese people over the one-party political
system. The Chinese government set up by the Communists in 1949 has been a de facto
authority that came as a result of the military victory over the Nationalists. The Mandate
of Heaven, or the presumably assumed level of political legitimacy, was waiting to be
confirmed by the expected consequence that the people were prospering (Nuyen, 2013).
Although Mao Zedong almost squandered the Mandate of Heaven, the system did not
become obsolete automatically, because the Communists’ military victory did not bring
about a mechanism that peacefully transferred power as Western democracies do. It
would take political reform to bring China a mechanism for a smooth power transfer.
The evidence that the overwhelming majority of the online survey participants did not
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believe that “the CCP had sufficient courage and wisdom to speed up reform” reflects the
fact that there have been too few tangible commencing efforts toward political reform.
On the other hand, it may also indicate that the general public in China may not be well
informed about what is going on about political reform in the country. Tangibility seems
to be the key for the Chinese people to perceive success in the CCP’s political reform
initiatives.
In fact, China has been building and has been increasingly practicing a “rulebased order.” Rudd (2014) claims that through constructing modernization as the
facilitator of happiness, the government has the capacity to continue the “rules-based
order” that has facilitated thirty years of rapid economic growth despite the rapid societal
transformations and conflicts that characterize modernization. In effect, modernization as
a priority for the government has been legitimized through laws designed to address
human rights issues. Regardless of the perceptions of the CCP, China has legitimized
modernization as the top legal priority. Through this process, China has developed a
political structure that is intended to protect modernization efforts while addressing
international calls for democratization. For example, the government typically allows for
the communication of information between the government and the populace, but the
government restricts the free-flow of communication if the communication threatens
modernization efforts (Zhao, 2010). Furthermore, the focus upon rules-based order
clarifies the roles of individual Chinese citizens in society. In doing so, political
decisions and discourse have become arguably more participatory and more structured.
There have been recent efforts to democratize intra-party relations (Zhao, 2010).
Additionally, the party has bureaucratized towards a model of formal institutional
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authority from a model of cults of personality while promoting transparency and
supervision within the party. Finally, the party has introduced “piecemeal and gradual
reform” in carefully selected, non-controversial areas (Zhao, 2010, p.429). This level of
bureaucracy and impersonality further strengthens the government’s claims that it is on
the path towards democratization.
In all of these initiatives, the Chinese government has more or less abandoned its
position as the party for the workers, and has replaced this foundation with the belief that
the party can be all things to all people (Zhao, 2010). The results of the survey, though,
indicate that the Chinese people may not realize the extent to which the CCP is becoming
more rationalized and bureaucratic. As such, the CCP will need to develop a transparent
narrative that explains the connection between economic development and social
modernization; this narrative must also explain why the perception of relative poverty is
excusable based on the other benefits of modernization. The step towards a
comprehensive and transparent narrative may function to cover the gap between de facto
legitimacy and the Mandate of Heaven specifically by explaining why modernization is
in the best interest of China’s populace.
Conclusion
Modernization in China is a very complex process that entails rapid societal
change in multiple areas of social life. China has made huge strides in modernizing its
economy and society. China’s experiences of the Four Modernizations have been highly
successful and are unprecedented in the world’s modernization history. The economic
and social gains achieved through this dedication to modernization are remarkable and
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incomparable to any other country’s experiences of modernization. Government plays a
crucial role in this process. In order to justify modernization as a worth-while pursuit, the
Chinese government is still faced with various daunting challenges. The rapidly growing
inequality in China poses a threat to political legitimacy. This would not be a threat in a
democracy, but it is in China, where the government is not elected and where it must
provide for the prosperity of its people in order to justify its legitimacy. The government
needs to strike a difficult balance between improving the standard of living for the poor
and providing incentives for the rich to contribute to the economy.
The Chinese government needs to speed up political reform not only to fix the
imbalance between the economic and political aspects of the modernization process, but
also to break the spell of its lack of legitimacy if it fails to bring about fairly distributed
prosperity. Most importantly, the Chinese Communist Party suffers from domestic
perceptions of its incompetency to lead in further reform, not because of the country’s
economic performance, but because of the lack of progress in political reform.
The Chinese Communist Party’s precarious legitimacy is also related to the
perception that it stands opposite to the Western conception of democracy which has
become a dominant global ideology (Torfason and Ingram, 2010). According to Rudd
(2014), China and the United States should develop public narratives about each other to
improve trust. The narratives should cover various issues including world order, security,
prosperity and human rights. The creation of this common narrative in international
relations would stabilize the legitimacy of the Chinese government on an international
level. If the Chinese government explains modernization as a vehicle towards political
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reform, then it is essential that other countries do not see China’s modernization as a
threat to the international world order.
One limitation of this study is that it uses aggregate data drawn from different
sources that does not permit statistical analysis. Statistical analysis would provide direct
support or lack thereof to the arguments. In other words, the arguments of this paper
should be perceived as tentative, because they are based on inferences from the data and
limited by leaps in the inferences. Future studies may need to collect or utilize
comprehensive data that warrant rigorous statistical analysis and more confident
conclusions.
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